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Perspective 1 
TOWARDS DISASTER RESILIENCE: A SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH TO CO-PRODUCING AND 2 
INTEGRATING HAZARD AND RISK KNOWLEDGE  3 
Tim Davies1,2*, Sarah Beavan1, David Conradson1, Alex Densmore2, JC Gaillard3, David Johnston4, 4 
Dave Milledge2, Katie Oven2, Dave Petley5, Jonathan Rigg6, Tom Robinson1, Nick Rosser2, Tom 5 
Wilson1 6 
Abstract 7 
Quantitative risk assessment and risk management processes are critically examined in the context 8 
of their applicability to the statistically infrequent and sometimes unforeseen events that trigger 9 
major disasters. While of value when applied at regional or larger scales by governments and 10 
insurance companies, these processes do not provide a rational basis for reducing the impacts of 11 
major disasters at the local (community) level because in any given locality disaster events occur too 12 
infrequently for their future occurrence in a realistic timeframe to be accurately predicted by 13 
statistics. Given that regional and national strategies for disaster reduction cannot be effective 14 
without effective local disaster reduction measures, this is a significant problem. Instead, we suggest 15 
that communities, local government officials, civil society organisations and scientists could usefully 16 
form teams to co-develop local hazard event and effects scenarios, around which the teams can 17 
then develop realistic long-term plans for building local resilience. These plans may also be of value 18 
in reducing the impacts of other disasters, and are likely to have the additional benefits of improving 19 
science development, relevance and uptake, and of enhancing communication between scientists 20 
and the public. 21 
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1. Introduction 24 
Current disaster reduction strategies are not working as well as anticipated (United Nations, 2011; 25 
Wisner at al., 2012); the societal impact of major naturally-triggered disasters continues to increase 26 
with time, although the number of fatalities appears to be falling (United Nations, 2009). The 27 
increasing impacts of natural events in part reflect increasingly vulnerable and growing populations, 28 
as well as the vulnerability of expanding infrastructure and investments, so that there is ever more 29 
to lose in any given disaster. The increasing impact of natural events may also reflect changes in 30 
earth system processes, due for example to climate change. Nevertheless, we suggest that more can 31 
be done to reduce the impacts of disasters at the local (community) level, by taking a novel 32 
approach to describing what we can know about future disasters. In particular, we suggest that 33 
current disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies are not fully effective in anticipating the impacts of 34 
disasters, and thus in allowing those potentially affected to take action to reduce these impacts. 35 
The present article is intended as a multi-disciplinary commentary, in the hope that it engages a 36 
multi-disciplinary audience in the topics of local-level disaster reduction and resilience building.  Our 37 
aim is to facilitate productive dialogue; we present what we see as key principles in a form that is as 38 
accessible as possible, to as many disciplines as possible, in order to encourage inter-disciplinary 39 
debate. In taking this approach we acknowledge that many of the topics we touch on have deep 40 
background literatures, and may in due course require much fuller treatment than we provide here. 41 
We begin by outlining some of the problems, both theoretical and practical, with current disaster 42 
reduction strategies. This leads to the suggestion that local event and effects scenarios, developed in 43 
collaboration with communities, could support local-level planning, complementing the use of 44 
conventional probabilistically-based risk analyses at regional and larger spatial scales by, for 45 
example, governments and insurance companies. We also suggest that community/local 46 
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government/civil society organisations/scientist teams can work to integrate community knowledge 47 
with science and ‘expert’ knowledge (or what Lane et al. (2011) call non-certified and certified 48 
expertise), so as to develop these disaster scenarios together. We argue that these co-produced 49 
scenarios, if generated with an awareness of the relevant policy and governance contexts, can serve 50 
as a useful consensual basis for developing more effective resilience strategies over time-scales of 51 
societal interest.  52 
2. Definitions 53 
“Community” is used widely in disaster risk reduction circles as a focus for local-level planning and 54 
bottom-up engagement but the concept is complex and contested. Cannon (2014) interrogates the 55 
concept of community in the context of grassroots work and the role of community level work in 56 
DRR, specifically arguing that there is no such thing as community; it is simply a convenient entry 57 
point for research, policy and practice. Whilst acknowledging this critique and the internal divisions 58 
and associated power dynamics that can exist, we use the term here to represent a varied group of 59 
people, spatially situated, who are – to some extent – socially and economically interlinked; and 60 
exposed to a disaster or disasters, both by virtue of their location in relation to particular hazards, 61 
and also as a result of development and increasing social inequality. We are particularly interested in 62 
communities from which a desire to increase their ability to plan for, cope with, and redevelop 63 
following a major disaster has been expressed. We recognise that every community is linked to and 64 
part of wider society, and that this two-way linkage helps shape community aspirations, behaviour 65 
and wellbeing. 66 
“Resilience” is notoriously difficult to define in an operational sense, even if intuitively less difficult 67 
to conceptualise in general terms (Alexander, 2013). For present purposes, we adopt the following 68 
definition of disaster resilience: ‘the ability of individuals, communities and states and their 69 
institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their 70 
structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty’ (OECD, 2013b, 1). A 71 
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current definition of disaster risk reduction (DRR) is ‘the concept and practice of reducing disaster 72 
risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including 73 
through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise 74 
management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events” (our 75 
emphasis; http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology).  76 
The essential purpose of DRR is to reduce the impacts of future disasters on society. The measures 77 
needed to achieve this are, by implication, measures that increase the resilience of society to 78 
disasters. In this commentary, we focus on rare and severe disaster events that are rapid in their 79 
onset e.g. earthquakes, landslide and floods.  However in doing so, we recognise that building 80 
resilience to such events cannot be tackled in isolation from the more frequent “everyday” hazards 81 
that impact people’s lives and livelihoods.  We also acknowledge that people may be constrained in 82 
terms of the actions that they can and are willing to take due to poverty and poor health, among 83 
other factors. Our focus here is on often known but rare events whose nature and time of 84 
occurrence are unpredictable, as these tend to be overlooked by comparison with the more 85 
frequent events that are more to the fore in public consciousness (and can, as we show, be used to 86 
develop awareness of more damaging events). The rare events are however very catastrophic when 87 
(inevitably) they do occur; our intent is to show that their effects can nevertheless be reduced, albeit 88 
not by using conventional disaster risk reduction procedures alone. 89 
On this basis, we now consider some of the impediments to improving the resilience of communities 90 
and the societies of which they are a part. 91 
3. Problems 92 
Disaster reduction has advanced considerably since the late 20th century. It has become more 93 
rigorously defined and organised, centring around risk management (UNISDR, 2009); it has also 94 
become more multidisciplinary and integrative (Twigg, 2004; Wisner et al., 2012). We have, for 95 
REVISION 3 Disaster Resilience Perspective  26 May 2015 
example, seen a recent surge of interest in incorporating science into DRR (e.g. Southgate et al., 96 
2013; DFID, 2012; Duncan et al., 2014; Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015).  When compared with the parallel 97 
area of environmental management, however, there remain a number of issues that impede 98 
progress in building the resilience of communities to disasters. Lavell and Maskrey (2014) identify 99 
many such obstacles, but two of the most important for the present argument are lack of political 100 
will and very limited decentralization and devolution of resources (financial and technical) to local 101 
government units to support local level disaster risk reduction . 102 
We see, in addition, three more fundamental difficulties in the conventional methodologies of 103 
disaster reduction:  104 
1. Limited and ineffective integration of science into disaster reduction planning, policy and 105 
practice. 106 
2. Lack of effective community participation in developing resilience to major disasters.  107 
3. Overemphasis on probabilistically-based hazard/risk assessment and management in the 108 
context of disasters. 109 
These difficulties are expanded on in turn: 110 
1. The natural and social sciences provide information on the behaviour of the natural 111 
processes of the planet, how they impact society, and how society responds to such 112 
impacts. We contend that these insights are as yet relatively poorly utilised in disaster 113 
reduction, for a number of reasons that include lack of or poor communication among 114 
the broad range of involved scientists, practitioners, policy-makers and lay persons. This 115 
limits the production and uptake of useful and useable science, with the result that 116 
planning and policy tend to be driven to a large extent by short-term economic and 117 
political concerns and priorities. 118 
2. In a specific locality, resilience-building aims to reduce the effects of future disasters on 119 
the people who live, work or play there, whether permanently or temporarily. Yet these 120 
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interest groups are rarely closely involved in the development of disaster reduction 121 
measures. Although there is often some degree of consultation with representatives of 122 
local interest groups, or even public meetings and focus groups, in many cases local 123 
community knowledge of societal and natural processes is neither sought nor 124 
incorporated into the disaster reduction planning process. When community 125 
participation is sought, it is not uncommon for the debate to be captured by more 126 
influential or powerful stakeholders (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mansuri and Rao, 2013; 127 
Mosse, 2005).  128 
3. Risk management is currently the common basis for disaster reduction worldwide; it 129 
depends on anticipation of future events able to trigger disasters, and their 130 
quantification and analysis (usually in terms of magnitude and probability). However 131 
there are (at least) five fundamental problems that limit the effectiveness of this 132 
approach for reducing disaster damage in a specified locality: 133 
a. Probabilistically-based event predictions for a specific locality are intrinsically 134 
unreliable even for known and well quantified disaster events because, by definition, 135 
potentially disastrous events occur only a small number of times at a given location 136 
in any realistic planning time-frame, and probabilistic predictions of small samples 137 
have an intrinsically high degree of unreliability (Davies, 2015). In other words, when 138 
only a very small number of disaster events will occur in a realistic planning time-139 
frame, it is extremely unlikely that their occurrence will match the probability of 140 
their occurrence. A further difficulty – albeit one that is less fundamental and more 141 
able to be remedied – is the fact that statistics for most disaster events are poorly-142 
defined. Probabilistically-based risk analysis is essential and useful to the disaster 143 
insurance industry, in part because this industry spreads risk over large spatial areas 144 
and temporal periods, so that the number of disaster events considered is always 145 
high. It is also useful for governments responsible for disaster reduction across large 146 
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areas of nations or regions. For local communities, however, it is of far less utility 147 
than conventionally assumed.  Despite this, probability-based risk analysis is often 148 
the default mechanism for risk management, even at local scales (e.g., Papathhoma-149 
Kohle et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2014) 150 
b. The impacts of large natural events on society result from the interaction of two 151 
complex dynamic systems: Earth processes and societal processes. Knowledge of the 152 
behaviour of complex systems suggests that the major hazard events that impact 153 
society are intrinsically unpredictable in location, timing and intensity (Kagan, 1997; 154 
Park et al, 2013; Sornette, 2002; 2009), and thus the societal consequences are likely 155 
to be unexpected when they occur. In addition, from (a) above, only the risks 156 
associated with smaller and more frequent events can be quantified adequately at 157 
the community scale. Risk management by definition requires risks to be known and 158 
therefore expected, and also adequately quantified, so cannot be reliably applied to 159 
disaster situations. Furthermore, the complex interactions between physical, 160 
ecological and human systems have to be seen and understood in the context of a 161 
rapidly transforming society. Social vulnerability, on the other hand, although also 162 
complex, is grounded in everyday life and reflects the structure of society (Wisner et 163 
al., 2004). Ultimately, integrating both the unpredictable dimension of natural 164 
hazards and the everyday nature of vulnerability is necessary and constitutes one of 165 
the key challenges facing us (Berkes, 2007; Folke, 2006; Wisner, 1995; Wisner et al., 166 
2012).  167 
c. The use of quantified risks to calculate cost-benefit ratios (or other utility 168 
optimisation criteria) leads to extremely imprecise results. These procedures involve 169 
calculating the differences between large and imprecise numbers (e.g. unmitigated 170 
annual damage and mitigated annual damage), the result of which is, inevitably, a 171 
much smaller and very much less precise number (in this case, gross benefit). When 172 
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the cost of mitigation measures (also necessarily imprecise) is subtracted from gross 173 
benefit to yield net benefit, the imprecision increases even more (see text box).  174 
d. Assigning an identified, large future event a very low probability usually means that it is 175 
assumed to be of lesser priority than more frequent - and therefore more “urgent” - 176 
smaller (but still large) events. Thus, when the large event does (inevitably) occur, it is in 177 
most cases unexpected because society – including local communities - has decided to 178 
ignore it or delay its consideration; in this context its low probability effectively becomes 179 
zero probability. 180 
 181 
TEXT BOX:   Sensitivity of cost-benefit analysis to small errors: 182 
Unmitigated average annual damage cost: $1,000,000 ± 10% = $900,000 - $1,100,000 183 
Mitigated average annual damage cost: $600,000 ± 10% = $540,000 - $660,000 184 
Gross average annual benefit: $560,000 – $240,000 ($400,000 ± $160,000 or $400,000 ± 40%) 185 
Annual average mitigation cost: $300,000 ± 5% = $285,000 - $315,000 186 
Net average annual benefit: $275,000 - $-75,000 ($100,000 ± $175,000 or $100,000 ± 175%) 187 
Thus the net average annual return on investment, neglecting errors, of $100,000/$300,000 = 188 
33%, is in fact anywhere between 92% and -25%. With increasing errors, the precision of the 189 
net average annual benefit deteriorates rapidly. While utility optimisation is only one of a suite 190 
of criteria relevant to disaster reduction decision-making, it often has considerable influence on 191 
decision-making because it is quantitative. 192 
 193 
e. The lack of effective local-scale disaster reduction caused by the limitations of risk 194 
management in turn means that efforts to reduce larger-scale (regional, national and global) 195 
disaster impacts (for example by optimising the availability of emergency resources and 196 
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advice) cannot be fully effective, although the probabilistic methodology can in principle be 197 
applied at the larger scales. 198 
4. A way forward 199 
From the above, it is evident that alternative strategies are required that enable communities to 200 
plan for large, poorly-quantified or unexpected events that occur rarely (but will occur, and can 201 
occur at any time), and to improve the uptake, relevance and completeness of science for local level 202 
resilience planning (Paton and Johnston, 2001). These alternative strategies – whatever they are – 203 
are required to complement the conventional risk-based disaster reduction strategies commonly in 204 
use.  205 
We outline below how these requirements can be met by using sets of scenarios, co-developed by 206 
communities, civil society organisations and local government officials working closely in teams with 207 
scientists (with a range of disciplinary expertises), to address those situations where risk 208 
management-based solutions are inadequate for the reasons set out above. These scenario sets 209 
describe the effects of large natural events on a community3, and provide a basis for further work by 210 
community-civil society-scientist-local government teams to devise strategies for reducing the 211 
impacts of these effects, thus increasing resilience. Finally, long-term partnerships between the 212 
different stakeholder groups are needed to build trust and to develop a more in-depth 213 
understanding of the social and natural systems and their changing vulnerability over time, and to 214 
maintain and improve resilience as both communities and natural systems – and our understanding 215 
of them – alter over time. 216 
This suggestion is a substantial departure from current practice. Its implementation will require local 217 
governments, civil society organisations, scientists and communities to learn how to work equitably 218 
and constructively with each other. These kinds of collaborations are presently being explored in a 219 
                                                          
3
 We mention here that these scenarios are in many ways similar to those commonly used in existing 
community-based DRR activities, although rarely for large events because of the lack of collaboration with 
scientists. 
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locality in New Zealand and as part of the Earthquakes without Frontiers project in Central and South 220 
Asia (http://ewf.nerc.ac.uk) by a number of authors of the present Commentary. What is really 221 
needed, however, is a set of simple methodologies that can be adapted for different contexts to 222 
guide the co-production of scenarios. Examples geared towards integrating different forms of 223 
knowledge and actions through enhanced dialogue between local and outside stakeholders have 224 
been trialled and the outcomes are encouraging in the context of expectable hazards such as floods 225 
(e.g. Lane et al. 2011; Cadag and Gaillard, 2012; Wisner et al., 2012).  However, we argue that such 226 
approaches need to be developed further to move beyond conceptual framings of knowledge 227 
integration and one-off examples, and to consider how such collaborations might work in the 228 
context of less predictable hazards such as earthquakes where the role of scientific knowledge is less 229 
clear.  Alongside, and informed by, this practical exploration of methodologies, work is needed to 230 
establish how these methodologies could be produced, piloted, evaluated, rolled out, monitored 231 
and revised. Within this work, there is a need to address the question of precisely who in a 232 
community should be involved (and what social sub-groups they represent), how to identify and 233 
recruit people (especially the less visible and harder to reach), and how to support those involved. 234 
Within local government and civil society, there is also a need to establish the approximate profile of 235 
the kinds of groupings required to complete the group that successfully produces scenarios 236 
together.     237 
4.1 Scenarios 238 
Rather than describing future disaster events primarily in terms of their magnitudes and 239 
probabilities, we suggest that information about what can happen in the most important disaster– 240 
the next one – can be better developed by communities, practitioners and policy-makers by using 241 
sets of scenarios. These scenarios describe the natural events that trigger disasters, together with 242 
anticipated consequences for other natural systems (such as the triggering of landslides and 243 
consequent river aggradation by earthquakes, e.g. Gill and Malamud, 2014). Together, they 244 
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comprise the event or hazard scenarios. The scenario sets also describe the effects of these natural 245 
events on societal systems (the effects or impact scenarios). In reality the variation in event 246 
scenarios is much greater than the variation in effects scenarios: the latter are mostly injuries, 247 
deaths and damage, loss of commerce, loss of communications, and isolation, whereas the former 248 
encompass earthquake, landslide, flood, storm, snow, ice, tsunami, debris flow and other processes. 249 
Thus we suggest that effects scenarios are more useful than event scenarios, both because they are 250 
more easily foreseen, and because these are the scenarios to which a community needs to develop 251 
and respond in order to become more resilient.  Co-developed by local and outside experts, the 252 
outcome is potentially better than any group could achieve on its own, or by means of consultation 253 
or communication with other groups. The event scenarios are based on known science, but crucially 254 
are informed and improved by the community’s experience of natural system behaviour and 255 
knowledge of the local social, cultural, economic and political context. The effects scenarios are 256 
based on the community’s knowledge of how it has been or could be affected by a particular hazard 257 
or hazards, the impact of the hazard(s) in terms of loss of life and livelihood (including the potentially 258 
uneven effects across society) and how the community wants to develop into the future e.g. the 259 
building of a new road to provide market access for the sale of cash crops. They are also informed by 260 
what science can say about future natural and human system behaviours e.g. the potential for future 261 
earthquakes and the impact of demographic change through labour migration on local level 262 
resilience (Rigg and Oven 2015). This process requires scientists to engage closely with the different 263 
members and parts of communities (including commercial and cultural interests, formal and 264 
informal governance structures, policy-makers, marginalised and vulnerable social groups, and other 265 
key stakeholders), and this in turn requires development of mutual trust among all involved (Gaillard 266 
and Mercer, 2013). This co-development process is beneficial not just because such engagement 267 
permits mutual learning, the sharing of existing knowledge and the co-production of new 268 
knowledge, but also because the knowledge that emerges is much more likely to have societal and 269 
scientific traction, because it will be perceived as relevant by all involved (Mercer, 2012; Wistow et 270 
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al. 2015). Knowledge and understanding of hazards and their effects is not only increased, improved 271 
and integrated into resilience planning, but is also intrinsically produced, rather than being simply 272 
disseminated, so as to become common to all involved. 273 
While it is well recognised that such initiatives should be community-owned and led to be successful, 274 
the role of government (local and national) and civil society organisations in these resilience teams is 275 
essential to unlock the political and economic resources required for local level resilience building 276 
(Maskrey 2011).  As summarised by Maskrey (2011: 51), in his review of community-based disaster 277 
risk management, such government-civil society partnerships ‘enable the investment of resources 278 
that are unavailable locally and increase continuity and sustainability as initiatives move from stand-279 
alone projects and programmes to longer-term processes’ (Maskrey 2011: 51).           280 
The quality of communication within the diverse community-civil-society-scientist-local government 281 
teams is crucial to the quality of the outputs. This requires acknowledgement and specific attention, 282 
involving perhaps an experienced and independent facilitator. 283 
4.2 Resilience planning 284 
When a set of scenarios has been developed that the team agrees is a useful representation of what 285 
can occur when the community experiences a disaster, the next stage is to develop ways of reducing 286 
the impacts of the chosen scenarios on society, in particular in the context of how the community 287 
foresees itself changing into the future. Indeed, thinking into the future is likely to highlight some 288 
specific strategies for increasing resilience, for example, by reducing dependence on particular social 289 
arrangements, processes or behaviours that contribute to present-day vulnerability to the given 290 
scenarios.  This may involve, for example, agricultural diversification; or, in extreme cases, gradual 291 
relocation of assets. 292 
In this strategy there is an implied assumption that increased resilience to the scenario effects will 293 
result in increased resilience to the next major event to affect the community, whatever it is, and so 294 
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the choice of the set of scenarios is clearly important (Alexander, 2000). By concentrating on the 295 
effects scenarios, and developing resilience to them by addressing the causes of vulnerability, there 296 
is also the possibility – albeit one that cannot be tested in advance - that societal resilience to events 297 
that differ significantly from the event scenarios will also be increased. As noted above, a powerful 298 
justification for community-chosen scenarios is that they are by definition highly relevant to the 299 
community; this perspective may need to be emphasised to counter external challenges that the 300 
chosen scenarios are less relevant than other scenarios.  301 
It may also be possible to use some scenarios, based on less extreme events whose effects are 302 
known locally, as ‘gateways’. These scenarios can be used as ways of building resilience to the 303 
effects of other events that the community has not yet experienced (Robledo et al., 2004). For 304 
example, a community with rich experience in dealing with the effects of frequent landslides may be 305 
able to use that experience to design arrangements or processes that will help build resilience to the 306 
effects of less frequent (but potentially much more damaging) earthquakes. Again, building 307 
scenarios for the effects of one event may help to build resilience to the effects of other events. 308 
Engagement and therefore empowerment with regard to the development of one scenario has the 309 
potential, we argue, to ripple through to other scenarios and events; this potential, however, 310 
remains to be tested, and is an avenue for future research. 311 
As in all attempts to manage human-natural system interactions, the effects of the resilience 312 
measures developed and implemented by the community-civil society-scientist-local government 313 
teams need to be continually monitored, evaluated, reflected on and adapted as the community and 314 
its natural environment evolve. The real effect of the resilience measures adopted will only become 315 
clearly evident following a disaster event, but the effects of minor events may give some useful 316 
indications of measures that could usefully be modified. This monitoring, evaluation and reflection 317 
need to be carried out by the community-scientist-local government team, which means that this 318 
team is not a one-off project collaboration but must continue to act as a resilience advisory team for 319 
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the community, as suggested by many community-based disaster risk reduction and management 320 
initiatives over the past three decades (e.g. Maskrey, 1984; Delica-Willison and Gaillard, 2012). Thus 321 
while such community-science-local government partnerships clearly have the potential to offer 322 
immediate benefits, it is also likely that these will increase over time. Ongoing joint engagement 323 
offers the best chance of maximising such benefits, and of facilitating adaptation to medium- and 324 
longer-term changes in natural and social systems. Involving communities in building scenarios for 325 
resilience will help to ensure maintenance of local focus when national policy attention turns 326 
elsewhere (Delica-Willison and Willison, 2004).  327 
Using the information derived from the documented co-production of scenarios and resilience-328 
building initiatives, both natural and social scientists can develop increasingly-sound scientific bases 329 
for understanding natural events and the vulnerability and resilience of society to disasters resulting 330 
from them. 331 
It is perhaps useful here to think about where the responsibility lies for planning community 332 
resilience to future disasters. Any community is a deeply-linked component of local, regional and 333 
national society, and while its well-being is of significance at all scales, its significance is nevertheless 334 
highest locally. Thus direct responsibility for planning for future disasters lies primarily in and around 335 
the community. In some cases, however, the regional and national linkages may be so important 336 
that a disaster to the community severely affects regional and national economies, for example the 337 
devastation of an iconic but small tourist town. Here responsibility is more widely distributed. In any 338 
case, implementation of resilience strategies will often be beyond local resources, and higher-level 339 
assistance will be needed. 340 
Finally, we acknowledge that the strategy we suggest has a number of potential drawbacks that may 341 
hinder its uptake. For example, the co-development of scenarios: 342 
 is likely to be time-consuming, a difficulty in an age of ever tighter deadlines and planning 343 
horizons, together with fixed project durations; 344 
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 requires trust, development of which also requires above all time to know others well; 345 
 requires considerable flexibility on all sides, which in turn requires that established positions 346 
need periodic  reflection and re-examination; 347 
 requires a community to recognise the existence of specific and unknown hazards and 348 
express a desire to address them which cannot be forced upon them;  349 
 requires recognition from the team that this may mean focusing on more immediate 350 
concerns of the community in the first instance until trust is built and priorities are aligned; 351 
and 352 
 requires recognition and navigation of the tensions between practical actions and research, 353 
and between practical actions and policy. 354 
Nevertheless, this strategy does appear to offer a way to increase the relevance of disaster risk 355 
reduction to local communities, leading to genuine reduction of future disaster impacts. 356 
5. Summary 357 
The imprecision intrinsic to probabilistically-based risk management means that it can be applied 358 
reliably only to large numbers of potential disaster events. This means in turn that, while applicable 359 
to disaster reduction across large areas (e.g., over nations or regions by governments, and over even 360 
larger areas by insurance companies), probabilistically-based risk management cannot reliably be 361 
used as the basis for community disaster reduction – which necessarily involves a limited spatial area 362 
– over planning time scales relevant to society. This leaves a crucial gap in disaster reduction 363 
methodologies locally, and therefore also at larger scales. Here we have suggested complementing 364 
the probabilistic risk management process, which operates effectively on well-known and frequent 365 
risks, with the development of disaster event and effects scenarios as a basis for local level resilience 366 
building for poorly-known or unknown risks (in which risk management has intrinsic unreliability). 367 
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The active and ongoing process of joint learning by community-civil society -scientist-local 368 
government teams engaged in developing these scenarios, and the resulting plans for gradually 369 
reducing vulnerability, have in addition the potential to (i) achieve greater integration between 370 
community experience and formal science, (ii) produce increased understanding of the complex 371 
behaviours of natural and social systems, and (iii) advance the natural and social sciences that 372 
describe hazard events and their effects (Lane et al., 2011) in relevant and applicable directions. 373 
This, we argue, is a key to making science more ‘useful, usable and used’ in DRR (Boaz and Hayden, 374 
2002) while providing communities with a basis for developing increased resilience to the next major 375 
disaster event. 376 
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